

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03647 01 OF 02 012126Z

64

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 OC-06 CCO-00 EB-11 NEA-14 OMB-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6544

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INFO USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3647

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-80

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS-AD HOC  
COMMITTEE MEETING JULY 1, 1974

REF: USNATO 2858

SUMMARY. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS HELD SECOND MEETING JULY 1. DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION, POSITIONS WERE RESTATED AND ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED SINCE LAST MEETING (REFTEL). MAJORITY OF COMMITTEE FELT THAT A COST EFFECTIVENESS STUDY WAS ESSENTIAL TO ASCERTAIN THE RELATIVE MERITS OF PROTECTION AT EVERE, COMPARED TO RELOCATION ALTERNATIVES WHICH ONLY THE US FAVORED. CHAIRMAN (PANSA) ASKED IF US COULD SUPPORT A COST EFFECTIVENESS STUDY EXAMINING BOTH OPTIONS (PROTECTION AND RELOCATION). ACTION REQUESTED. WASHINGTON GUIDANCE. END SUMMARY.  
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PAGE 02 NATO 03647 01 OF 02 012126Z

1. CHAIRMAN OF AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS (PANSA) NOTED THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BY THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE THAT THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVIDING PROTECTION AT

EVERE SHOULD COMPARED TO THAT OF THE RELOCATION ALTERNATIVE AS ADVOCATED BY THE US.

2. DIRECTOR OF COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS (MACBRIEN) REPORTED THAT HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND SHAPE AND HAD VERIFIED THAT NEITHER HAD THE IN HOUSE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE COST ESTIMATE FOR PROVIDING PROTECTION AT EVERE OR FOR INVESTIGATING RELOCATION ALTERNATIVES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS. HE SUMMARIZED THE NICSMA REPORT AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE POSITION WHICH RECOMMEND AGAINST CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW BUILDING AT EVERE FOR NICSMA IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING THE LEASE ON THE PRESENT NICSMA OFFICE SPACE IN BRUSSELS. THE DECISION TO EXTEND THIS LEASE MUST BE MADE BY SEPTEMBER 1.

3. PANSA NOTED THAT THE LOSS OF THE POSSIBLE OPTION TO COLLOCATE A PROTECTED NATO HQ WITH A NEW NICSMA BUILDING INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE AD HOC COMMITTEES WORK. MACBRIEN QUICKLY POINTED OUT THAT THE PREVIOUS COEC RECOMMENDATION( WITH US RESERVATION) TO COMMISSION A FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR PROTECTION AT EVERE WAS INDEPENDENT OF A NICSMA MOVE, ALTHOUGH A POSSIBLE ECONOMY OF EFFORT WAS SEEN IF THE MOVE WERE TO TAKE PLACE.

4. US REP (BOWMAN), IN RESPONSE TO PANSA INVITATION, MADE A STATEMENT SUMMARIZING THE US POSITION. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. TO ENSURE DETERRENCE, WE MUST CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT NATO IS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY MILITARY THREAT. THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE NATO HQ IS PART OF THAT REQUIREMENT, BUT THE US DOES NOT FEEL THAT A HARDENED SITE AT EVERE IS THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE HEAD-QUARTERS.

B. NICSMA, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF COST AND INABILITY TO FORECAST THE SIZE OF ITS FUTURE STAFF, HAS RECOMMENDED CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 03647 01 OF 02 012126Z

AGAINST A MOVE TO A NEW BUILDING AT EVERE. NICSMA'S WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER IF NATO HQ WERE TO PROVIDE SEMI-PROTECTED UNDERGROUND ACCOMMODATIONS IS A CASE OF PUTTING THE CART IN FRONT OF THE HORSE.

C. LIMITED PROTECTION( DEPENDING ON WHAT THE BUDGET WILL BEAR) IS WORSE THAN NOTHING AT ALL; IF THE SOVIETS HAVE 5000 KG GENERAL PROPOSE AND 1000 KG ARMOR PIERCING BOMBS, THEY COULD CERTAINLY USE THEM IF THEY MADE THE DECISION TO NEUTRALIZE EVERE.

D. WHILE THE US OPPOSES HARDENING AT EVERE, IT AGREES THAT AN ALTERNATIVE IS NECESSARY. THIS ALTERNATIVE, INVOLVING RELOCATION, SHOULD BE PRIMARILY A PLANNING EFFORT WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL INVESTMENT FOR EQUIPMENT.

E. OUR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS SHOW THAT MOBILE

COMMUNICATIONS ARE POSSIBLE NOW AND AN EVENTUAL PTT  
TIE IN WITH NICS IS ENTIRELY FEASIBLE. WE FEEL THE  
NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND NICSMA HAVE THE NECESSARY  
EXPERTISE TO REPORT ON MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT  
RESORTING TO A FEASIBILITY STUDY.

F. WHILE THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS  
HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OFFER A SUITABLE PROTECTED RELOCATION  
SITE, WE SUGGEST THAT THIS SEARCH BE REOPENED TO  
IDENTIFY EITHER COMMERCIAL OR GOVERNMENT RELOCATION SITES  
WHICH WOULD NOT BE HARDENED.

G. WE DO NOT FEEL THE COMMITTEE HAS YET EXAMINED  
RELOCATION OPTIONS MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR RUMSSFELD  
AT THE FEB 27 NAC WHICH L#TO THE FORMATION OF THIS AD HOC  
COMMITTEE. WE REQUEST THAT THIS COMMITTEE CONTINUE  
TO FUNCTION AND THAT RELOCATION ALTERNATIVES BE  
FURTHER EXAMINED.

NOTE BY OCT: NATO 3647 #AS RECEIVED.

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PAGE 01 NATO 03647 02 OF 02 012116Z

64

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 3647

5. DURING THE FOLLOWING GENERAL DISCUSSION, ITALIAN  
DEPUTY PERMREP (BETTINI) SUMMARIZED THE TWO OPTIONS  
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE INVOLVING (1) RELOCATION AS ADVOCATED  
BY THE US AND (2) PROTECTION AT EVERE AS FAVORED BY THE  
REMAINING NATIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT BEFORE AN  
INTELLIGENT DECISION COULD BE MADE, THESE TWO OPTIONS SHOULD BE  
INVESTIGATED AS TO HOW THEY WOULD WORK AND HOW MUCH THEY  
WOULD COST. THEREFORE, SOME MONEY MUST BE SPENT FOR STUDIES

OF THE TWO OPTIONS AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW  
HOW MUCH MONEY WOULD BE INVOLVED TO GET THE FACTS.  
MACBRIEN COMMENTED THAT, BASED ON THE 25,000 IAU  
AUTHORIZED FOR NICSMAS STUDY AND ON OTHER EXPERIENCE HE FELT  
THAT A TOTAL OF 40,000 TO 50,000 IAU WOULD BE REQUIRED  
FOR A COST EFFECTIVENESS FEASIBILITY STUDY ON BOTH THE  
PROTECTION AND RELOCATION OPTIONS.

6. THE UK AND DANISH REPS ENDORSED BETTINIS VIEWS,  
ALSO FEELING THAT THE KEY LIES IN THE INVESTIGATION OF  
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PAGE 02 NATO 03647 02 OF 02 012116Z

THE COMPARATIVE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TWO APPROACHES  
TO PROVIDING FOR THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HQ.  
THE FRG REP REPORTED THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT  
ALLOW FOR SUPPORT OF ANY RELOCATION ALTERNATIVE, BUT  
THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE COMPARATIVE COST EFFECTIVENESS  
APPROACH TO HIS AUTHORITIES. THE INS REP ADVANCED  
THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S VIEW THAT THE NATO HQ  
WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY TARGET AND SHOULD BE  
PROTECTED REGARDLESS OF LOCATION.

7. IN SUMMING UP, PANSA EXPRESSED HIS STRONG VIEW  
THAT THE ONLY LOGICAL COURSE IS TO CONDUCT A COST EFFECTIVENESS  
STUDY OF THE TWO OPTIONS (PROTECTION AND RELOCATION)  
AND THAT SUCH A STUDY WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY PRE-JUDGE  
EITHER OPTION. PANSA, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE REST OF THE  
COMMITTEE, ASKED IF THE US COULD PARTICIPATE IN SUCH  
A STUDY ASSUMING THE TOTAL COST WAS ON THE ORDER OF  
40,000-50,000 IAU. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON  
GUIDANCE.

8. FINALLY PANSA NOTED THAT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WAS  
TO HAVE REPORTED BACK TO THE NAC BY JULY 1 AND THAT HE  
WILL CIRCULATE A DRAFT REPORT FOR COMMENTS. MISSION  
WILL TRANSMIT TO WASHINGTON WHEN RECEIVED. RUMSFELD

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